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The Bank of France and the Open-Market
instrument:
an impossible wedding?∗
BARBAROUX Nicolas †
Abstract
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt criss, open-market interventions
prevailed within the central bank’s policy answers known under the label
unconventional monetary policy measures. During interwar period, France
was an isolated case, among the leading countries, by everlastingly rejecting
open-market operations in its monetary policy toolset. The present study
analyzes the French monetary policy history by explaining why Bank of
France had been so old-fashioned in monetary policymaking for too long
time. Moreover, the article provides an explanation of the latter point by
raising five major arguments of explanation : (1) the irrelevancy of the French
interwar monetary reforms which enabled the Bank of France to conduct
open-market operations per se; (2) the French conservatism throughout the
insiders’ view from the Bank of France leaders (not only governors and deputy
governors, but also the General Council’s members at the head of the French
central bank); (3) the legacy of a metallist vision, embodied by Charles Rist,
within the French economists of that time (4) the negative public opinion
regarding open-market operations which were seen as being an inflationist
public debt financing instrument and lastly (5) the unfair competition that
occurred between the discounting operations and the open-market operations
in the Bank of France’s balance sheet.
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Introduction
The 2008 crisis’ epicenter put the stress on the money market mainly through-
out two ‘black swan’ phenomenon (Taylor and Williams 2009) and the result-
ing upsurge in interest rates spreads (LIBOR-OIS spreads, EONIA-EURIBOR
spreads and so on..). This financial crisis, inherited from the collapse of the
mortgage credit (sub)market, put the spotlights on the necessity for central
banks to intervene on the capital markets as well. In fact, the different types
of unconventional or non-standard monetary policy measures taken by the
ECB or the Fed restore more intensive open-market purchases so as to provide
liquidity to the interbank money market (Giannone, Lenza, Pill, and Reich-
lin 2012) and to the economy as a whole. By so doing, central banks put
aside, maybe temporarily, their traditional monetary neutrality which was
the outcome of the 2004 Nobel Prizers works on inconsistency plans (Kyd-
land and Prescott 1977). By playing their lender in last resort role, central
banks favored their discretionary power -rather than their rule-like-behavior-
by providing directly liquidities to private firms or States. All of that open
interrogations and doubts on the monetary policy rule optimality as com-
pared to a discretionary monetary policy. It seems that in the aftermath
of financial crisis, the way we think and we speak about monetary policy
changed. When external instability faces internal instability, thus monetary
policy becomes more inclined to be considered as rule-like-behavior with due
degree of discretionary power rather than a strict and automatic rule of con-
duct (Barbaroux 2013). Beyond this theoretical issue, there is a practical one
that emerged: what status should be given to open-market (discretionary)
purchases within monetary policy toolset ? In such an inquiry, the French
monetary history during interwar is enlightening.
As mentioned by Friedman in his last times, and also by several other
great economists -such as Keynes, Wicksell, Cassel or the League of Nations
Report- the French monetary policy had been unique during interwar1. In
these interwar times, and beyond, the Bank of France was considered as
1In 2004, Friedman republished his seminal book on ‘Monetary History of the United
States (1867-1960)’ (with A. Swartz). It was in that opportunity that those words were
declared. Milton Friedman wrote as follows: "Reading the English translation of the mem-
oirs of Emile Moureau (Governor of the Bank of France, 1926-1928) persuaded me that
we understated the role of France in the international transmission of the contraction. [...]
The international effects (regarding the great depression) were severe and the transmission
rapid, not only because the gold exchange standard had rendered the international financial
system more vulnerable to disturbances, but also because the United States did not follow
gold-standard rules. Were I writing the sentence today, I would say: "because the United
States and France did not follow gold-standard rules". (Friedman 2004: 349).
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being responsible of the Gold Standard collapse in the early 1931. Among
the main reproach, the lack of open market procedure prevailed particularly
from the English side.
By open market we mean the freedom given to the central bank to buy and
sell short-term public assets, mainly Treasury bonds, on the money market
so as to tighten or expand the monetary mass (banknotes) circulation while
leading the short-term capital market. In that time, the open-market policy
was a means of anticipating the discount claim from private banks to the bank
of issue’s windows. Contrary to the other major central banks, the Bank of
France was late in setting up open market instrument within its toolset. From
the first attempt in 1928, it took ten years to the Bank to move from a market
follower position to a market maker one. The official monetary law that gave
the Bank of France the full ability to manage open-market purchases was
the one decided in 1938, June 17th. Before that, the previous monetary
laws were only unsuccessful attempts in that direction. At first sight, the
French rejection on open-market can be explained by the fact the Bank of
France was already over-present within the French banking system and took
care to whatever demands in liquidity (i.e discounting operations) from the
private commercial banks. As the French economist Pierre Ricard wrote in
an internal note for the Bank of France Economics Studies departments in
1929: "the fact that the Bank of France had always been ready, whatever the
circumstances, to participate in the money market and to finance the private
banking system prevented the country to set up an autonomous day to day
money market." (Ricard, 1929)2. However, other reasons can be considered.
This French passivity or conservatism is not the result of a random walk but
it can be explained by both political and economical backgrounds. The aim
of this paper -and the prevailing thesis defend- is to demonstrate to what
extent the French rejection for setting up open-market device was mainly
linked with a risk of loss in profitability for Bank of France. In that sense,
the French monetary conservatism was no more than a rationale economic
calculus.
The main question raised by the article is to what extent the Bank of
France had an advantage to reject open-market for so long time ? The main
argument we want to test is twofold: (1) the open-market operations was seen
as a substitute of the advance on liquidities to the French government, and
(2) the open-market operations were seen as an unfair competition towards
the discount operations that were the profit maximizing source of revenue
for the Bank.
2Internal note from Bank of France archive, Reference Number: 1397 1994 03- 66.
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Five leading argument will be considered: (1) the irrelevancy of the mone-
tary reforms to conduct open-market operations; (2) the French conservatism
throughout the insiders’ view from the Bank of France leaders (not only gov-
ernors and deputy governors, but also the General Council’s members at the
head of the French central bank); (3) the legacy of a metallist vision, embod-
ied by Charles Rist, within the French economists of that time and (4) the
negative public opinion regarding open-market operations which were seen
as being an inflationist and public debt instrument; and lastly (5) the unfair
competition that occurred between the discounting operations and the open-
market operations in the Bank of France’s balance sheet. By surveying the
French newspapers in that time we can take into account the French public
opinion concerning this new monetary policy strategy. For sure the above
five arguments interacted one with each other so as to explain this French
paradoxical conservatism.
After surveying the step by step setting of the open-market instrument
within the French monetary policy toolset (Part I), the paper put the stress
on the political and economical context in which the open-market debate
occurred. We will focus on the way French economists and Bank of France’s
economists’ saw the open-market purchases (Part II) mainly throughout the
eyes of Rist and Quesnay. The last section will conclude (Part III).
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1 The step by step setting of the open-market
instrument
The open-market procedure has a long history in France. This story is char-
acterized by an everlasting rejection of this monetary policy device, mainly
due to the French historical background. This point had strongly been de-
bated among economists and central bank’s advisors notably by Keynes un-
der the Macmillan Commission in 1931. While Keynes and the international
economic community encouraged open-market instrument in central bank’s
toolbox, the Bank of France saw it as inappropriate mainly because it was
accused of being inflationist. Without any doubt, the 1936 year had been
a turning point in the French monetary history. Firstly, the French franc is
no longer fixed to a unique gold weight but rather to a flexible standard of
gold weight. But,secondly, for the first time in its history, France started to
manage a kind of open-market policy thanks to the July, 24th law concern-
ing the Bank of France status. From that time on, open-market procedure
made a (big) step towards an official recognition among the monetary policy
instruments event though the monetary device will only be effective in 1938.
The French open-market history was a winding road that needed four step,
throughout four major monetary laws, before implementing open-market per
se.
1.1 Step 1: The monetary Convention from 1928, June,
25th monetary law
The open-market debate emerged in the early days of the French franc’s
stabilization after WWI when the group of economists in the Bank of France
wondered what type of reforms the institution should conduct in order to
expand the operational autonomy of the bank of issue (Blancheton 2001:
29). Thus, the Bank of France adopted fiscal and monetary regulations both
in 1928 and 1929. Among those proposals for reform, the open- market
operations emerged and created a real debate, if not to say a division, among
the group of economists. Most of them were influenced by Charles Rist’s
monetary doctrines according to which open market was just a means to
expand State’s hunger for liquidity3. In that sense, open-market instrument
was a source of inflation and public indebtedness.
It is right that the 1928 Poincaré law is a first step toward open-market
3Rist (1927) declared as follows in his book on deflation: ‘the inflation was created in
the form of the advances successively agreed by the Bank of France to the government.’
(ibid: 60).
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operations. However, this step was only a half one. The 1928 stabilization
law (known under the name of Poincaré Law) had been supplemented by a
1928 Convention voted in June 2nd between the Bank of France and the Re-
demption Fund (i.e Caisse d’amortissement). The Bank of France received
5.930 millions of French francs Redemption funds’ assets as a counterpart
of the Treasury bonds it discounted during the WW I and which had been
used to finance foreign loans. Added to the discount rate policy, the Con-
vention empowered the Bank of France to use a light version of open-market
operations under two procedures:
1. Article 3, Specific direct channel:
The Bank of France could sell or buy, when the need arose, its assets
from the Redemption Fund. Most of those assets were issued as a
counterpart of the amount lost originated from the Russian loans4.
More precisely, the 1928 Convention stated that the bank of issue could
buy commercial papers with a minimum amount of 50 000 French francs
and the assets needed to have no more than 90 days validity. Due
to this regulation, the first discounting company, called "Compagnie
Parisienne de Réescompte", was created in order to proceed to these
light version of open market operations.
2. Article 9, The traditional indirect channel:
The Bank of France had the authority to ‘undertake, for the account of
foreign Central Banks who had opened a current account in its books,
the purchase of bills and short term securities [...] It (i.e the Bank
of France) could discount those commercial papers, when those banks
asked for it, from which it is allowed to guarantee until the end.’
In spite of those two new procedures, Bank of France did not use them
mainly because it was costly. In fact, the Redemption fund’s assets the Bank
of France received were free of interests, meaning that in case of assets’ sales,
the Bank of France would have to pay the interests to the buyers.
Later on, France conducted three main reforms in 1929 that planned to
develop the French monetary market:
4Russia had stopped paying back the loans agreed to by the Bank of France in 1917.
So that, the newly created Fund was in charge of settling this debt that took the form of
Russian Treasury bonds (those ended in 1945). This debt was not taken into account in
the Bank of France balance sheet. As a counterpart, the Fund issued three months bonds
(with free interest) that it gave to the Bank of France for the corresponding amount of
the Russian loans.
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1. the Bank of France decided in 1929 to discount only franc denominated
commercial papers;
2. the Bank of France authorized the discount of commercial papers for
a seven days period (with the possibility of renewing it for a new five
day period);
3. the French Bank Bill (’Banque Française d‘acceptation‘) had been cre-
ated5.
Those last three reforms, and mainly the third one, were strategic. It was
a means for France to escape from the British domination of London mone-
tary markets. Before those reforms, huge amounts of money were transferred
by French private banks to London‘s monetary markets which, then, influ-
enced the exchange value of the franc. Private banks needed liquidity avail-
able in the short term that the monetary market in France did not have. The
two opposite monetary policymaking strategy clearly appeared in that time.
While France favored monetary conservatism, under discount rate manage-
ment and a strict gold covering ratio, the Bank of England abandoned any
strict cover ratio between the gold cash balances and the bank‘s deposits.
In fact, the Bank of England freely intervened on the monetary market by
selling or buying Treasury bonds so as to influence the amount of liquidity
available without having to change its discount rate6.
1.2 Step 2: Monetary regulation from 1935 February
This new step started from the Bank of France new freedom to agree short-
term (i.e from 7 days to 30 days) advances backed on public assets, mainly
Treasury bonds, with a maximum of two years maturity. This new regulation
5The creation of the French Bank Bill involved several French banks who cooperated
both financially and institutionally. This institution was a bank of acceptance. A bank-
ing acceptance is an asset held by a bank that originally comes from the discount of a
commercial paper (effet de commerce). The acceptances were used for the needs of in-
ternational trade. It was a credit device that allowed an importer,via its local bank, to
pay for its purchases, to the foreign bank of the exporter, through the circulation of this
peculiar asset. When large amounts were concerned, this asset could then be exchanged
with another bank who would find a means of investing its available bank deposits.
6We need to take into account that the British banking sector was quite different to
that of France. The latter was self-centered, meaning strongly influenced by the Bank
of France, and competition between private banks was moderate. However, the Bank of
England was more of an "orchestra conductor" leading private deposit banks which had
the power to create (bank) money through bank cheque circulation. The British banking
sector was mainly directed through the discount market that empowered the Bank of
England to act on the private banks and encourage/discourage credit within the economy.
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could have been really influential for the French liquidity markets since it
opened a new source of liquidity funding -as compared to the traditional
discounting operations- with a lower price. In fact, from that 1935 law,
the private banks could ask short-term advances to the Bank of France by
paying only the discount rate whereas the advances in liquidity from assets
were traditionally provided, before that, at the broker loan rate which was
higher than the discount one7. However, this type of money market was only
an ersatz of a true open-market policy due to the small amount it provided
to the banking system.
This light version of open-market instrument did not help the banking
system by providing a new source of liquidity. However, beyond the small
amount that had been traded, two main features separated this new source
of liquidity with an open-market policy per se. Firstly, the operation was
unilateral. It was only the commercial banks that could ask for liquidities
to the Bank of France and neither the reverse. Secondly, the cost of the
short-term advances depended on the discount rate and it could not freely
fluctuate according to the vagaries on the money market. In that sense, it
was still an administrative management of the liquidity market as opposed
to a free market based management.
1.3 Step 3: Monetary law from 1936 July, 24th on the
Bank of France official status
Few months later with the last monetary regulations, France decided to make
a new (small) step towards open-market practices by allowing the Bank of
France to discount in an unlimited amount the Treasury floating debt assets
which were due to a maximum of a three months period (Kritz, 1938 : 143)8.
However, this discounting operations was not authorized for the account of
the French Treasury in order to prevent the hazard moral from political power
to expand its deficit and debt. The 1936 July, 24th law made a step toward
open-market purchases -as opposed to the traditional discounting windows-
however, as in the previous case, those new source of liquidity were initiated
by borrowers only, meaning the commercial banks, and neither by the Bank
of France itself. As a consequence, the 1936 law did not fully set up open-
7The ‘broker loan rate’ is a specific rate of interest determined by the General Council
within the Bank of France. This rate of interest was charged to private banks which
borrowed liquidity, however, it could not be lower than the discount rate which represented
a minimum rate in the French banking system.
8In that time in 1936, several European central banks had already experimented open-
market operations. Most of them were: the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, the German Reichsbank and the Netherlands Central Bank.
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market in France as long as those liquidity funding operations will not result
from both sides of the banking system.
In spite of the fact open-market was not put in practice yet, the 1936
monetary law called for strong reactions among the economists’ community.
At first sight, the new regulation was seen and understood, mainly by the
press and general opinion, as an indirect help for the State’s needs in liquidity.
For that reason, Bank of France had to reacted by publishing an internal
and private note from the Economics Studies Department from the General
Secretary of the Bank. It published it in 1936, November 7th so as to restore
confidence on its official goals. The internal note pointed out that: “the
changes we brought in the Bank of France status should not be understood
as the sign of the forthcoming inflationary policy or an indirect help to the
State.”9. Moreover, the internal note recalled that “contrary to what had been
published by the press and newspapers, the 1936 law does not authorized the
Bank of France to buy or sell government’s securities, that is to say to act on
long-term interest rates and on the evolution of the stock markets’ values.”
(ibid). In other words, the discount rate management with a unique rate
leading the market still prevailed.
1.4 Step 4: The 1937 July Law and the Law decree from
1938 June, 17th
It was only from that stage that open-market entered in the French mon-
etary policy. It was the law decree dated back from 1938 June, 17th that
recognized open-market practices among the Bank of France official status10.
According to this new regulation, the French monetary policy could manage
open-market operations defined as follows:
“Art.1: In order to act on the credit volume and to regularize
the money market, Bank of France is allowed to buy and sell,
into the limited amount and conditions decided by the General
Council, on the money market (called in France the “free market”)
public negotiable short-term assets and private assets which are
officially admitted to be discounted.”.
Official Journal from 1938, June 29th, p. 7443.
Other texts and articles fixed the conditions according to which open-
market should be conducted11:
9Bank of France archive, Reference Number: 1069 2008 03- 17
10Bank of France archive, Reference Number: 1360 2007 01-45
11July, 7th, 1938, Reference number: 1069 2008 03-16
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• Art. 1: the assets which are concerned by open-market operations
are: the Treasury bonds, the bonds from the National Defense, the
assets from the French National Railway Company (called SNCF) and
banking acceptances;
• Art. 2 and 3: each operation should reach a minimum amount of
100000 French francs (unless for the banking acceptances which could
be traded for a 50000 French francs amount) with a maximum of two
years maturity term;
• Art. 8: the open-market operations should not amount to more than
8% of the gold reserves in the Bank of France.
The article 8 was mainly motivated by the desire to give a force of op-
position to the Bank. In fact, the content of the article 8 had given birth
to strong and long discussions between the General Council members within
the Bank of France. Most of them were worried about the possibility given
to the Treasury to find in the open-market policy a new source of funding.
These strong discussions were summarized in thirteen pages within the report
from the General Council. A confidential note within the Economic Studies
Department of the Bank gave the content of these discussions12. Among the
proposition, two prevailed: (1) to limit the open-market purchases to the
amount of a few asset items (such as the amount of private deposits or the
amount of the current accounts of the Stabilization Funds and the Foreign
Exchange Supporting Fund) of the balance sheet of the Bank of France; (2)
to limit the open-market purchases to the amount of a fixed ratio with the
gold reserves or a fixed ratio with the asset portfolio and advances in liquidity
provided.
In practice, the article 8 lasted only one year. The open-market roof
had quickly been exceeded from 1939. As a consequence, an extraordinary
General Council meeting had been organized in February, 29th 1940 so as to
abrogate it. Thus, the article 8 had been canceled and substituted in July,
1939 by the following article: “the amount of the (open-market) operations
should never exceed ten billion of French francs.” 13. Few months later,
this official roof quickly changed once more and amounted to fifteen billions
of French francs14. From 1939 to 1968 the amount of the roof had always
been increased by successive decrees. The table (1) in appendix summarizes
12Bank of France Archive, Reference Number: 1069 2008 07- 17
13Statement from the extraordinary session of the Bank of France General Council from
February, 29th, Reference Number: 1069 2008 03-16.
14Bank of France General Council from 1940 October, 30th, Reference Number: 1069
2008 03-16
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the successive maximum amounts authorized by the General Council for the
open-market purchases. It was only in 1968 that the maximum amount on
open-market purchases had been canceled.
From that period, we have to note that Bank of France could act not
only on the monetary market but also on the financial one. In fact, in
1937, France decided as well to create the French governmental securities
support Fund (Fond de soutien des rentes) which enabled it to intervene on
long term market, mainly on the governmental stocks market. This new
monetary institution was granted by a seven billion of French franc capital
resulting from the profit emanating from the reevaluation of the gold stocks
in the Bank of France when French franc had been (re)defined by a new par,
i.e one French franc valued 43mg.ofgold. The newly created Fund aimed
at buying and selling long term public debt assets or whatever other assets
-both in short and long terms- from the French Treasury.
This laws survey on open-market practices demonstrates us to what ex-
tent France was conservative in monetary field. Bank of France never aban-
doned its old fashioned way of speaking and thinking monetary policy, mainly
by way of quantitative management of monetary policy even for open-market
interventions. As it appeared among the economists’ views in that time, and
particularly, among the French public opinion: open-market should be seen
as a complementary tool but neither as the leading instrument of the mone-
tary circulation. Monetary policy was- and had always been- a discount rate
management that should regulate the monetary mass circulation (mainly
banknotes issue). However, during interwar and in times of inconvertibility
such way of thinking is disconnecting from the new way economics functioned
(i.e huge issue of public debt assets and wide fluctuations of the exchange
rates).
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2 The French opinion regarding open-market
operations
Before the 1938 year, the French (interbank) monetary market did not prac-
tically existed per se in the extent it was downgraduated as a market outside
the scope of the Bank of France and the whole French economy as well. In
fact, the French monetary market was labelled as the “outside banking mar-
ket” (marché hors banque) or the “free market” due to its lack of specific
regulations and the lack of influence from Bank of France. Moreover, for a
considerable long period, the French interbank market was self- centered in
Paris and it was no more than a market for acceptances assets15. Such state
of affairs well illustrates the absence of consideration for the interbank money
market until the 1938 monetary law and within monetary policy toolset. This
french public opinion on open-market was driven by both the schizophrenia
for gold and the great influence of metallist ideas with its French spokesman
Charles Rist. However, other voices emerged so as to give a new youthful-
ness to the French monetary policy. Two clans emerged: the insiders group
which gathered the Charles Rist and the Bank of France economists’ within
the General Council and the outsiders led by Pierre Quesnay and the Gov-
ernor Moreau in place. The French public opinion -such as it appeared in
the newspapers we collected from the Bank of France archive- was mainly in
favor of the insiders group.
2.1 The French economists’ views on open-market
Contrary to the Swedish economists who were well known for their intensive
involvement in the writing for periodicals, newspapers or public conference
(Carlson and Jonung 2005), the French ones were the opposite. As mentioned
by Fontana (2000), French economists were not really popular in the early
twentieth century. They suffered from a lack of international recognition
due to their (over) involvement in political and institutional issues. For
instance, the French economists of the late eighteenth century were given
abroad the negative label the ‘Parisian group’ in allusion to their influence in
the restrictive area of Paris’ institutions. In his survey of the French economic
tradition, Schumpeter (1954) shared this opinion by claiming that: “their
main interest was not the ‘purely scientific aspect of economy’ but business
15Those assets were used for the needs of international trade. It was a credit device
that allowed an importer, via its local bank, to pay for its purchases, to the foreign bank
of the exporter, through the circulation of this peculiar asset. When large amounts were
concerned, this asset could then be exchanged with another bank who would find a means
of investing its available bank deposits.
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and political practice” (Fontana 2000: 236). However, this poor reputation of
French economists changed at the beginning of the twentieth century with an
emerging younger generation. They were the opposite to the old ones as they
had reached an international stance through their theoretical works or their
international influence among leading institutions. Of this new generation,
the most influential were Charles Rist, André Gide, Bertrand Nogaro and
Albert Aftalion. Only a few of the old generation were a part of this group,
such as Jacques Rueff16. Charles Rist was withount any doubt the most
influential among them in the French monetary thought.
2.1.1 Charles Rist and the Bank of France: the insiders views
The leading ideas that open-market operations were a source of inflationary
process was clearly inherited from Rist’s metallist dogma. The later ideas
prevailed for a long time within the Bank of France corridors. During the
interwar period, the influence exerted by Charles Rist (1874-1955), even after
his deputy-governor mandate, is not to be questioned. As Dehem (Dehem:
206) wrote “Rist provides the key to understanding the French position in
monetary matters as opposed to the typical Anglo-American stance in the
past 60 years”. Rist got the particularity of being influential both in the
academic circle and the institutional circle of the Bank of France. He was
a monetary expert in several foreign countries such as Portugal or Romania
while being member of the board of experts in 1926 that worked on the
stabilization of the franc. He had been second-deputy-governor in the Bank
of France between 1926 and 1929.
Rist was a representative in France of the ‘metallist’ dogma that had al-
ready prevailed in the previous century (with the collaboration of Jacques
Rueff). Yet, by updating Took’s position on paper-money, Rist distinguished
himself from the traditional metallist embodied in the Ricardian theory. For
this reason, he was labelled as a ‘dissident metallist’ 17. The quotation from
Dehem was an explicit allusion to the prevalence of metallism in France
through Rist. According to the metallists’ views, money value does not ex-
ist in itself, it is the metal, whether gold, silver or copper, that gave value
to money (Rist 1938). In terms of function, Rist saw money as being es-
16Jacques Rueff was considered to be a member of the ‘Paris group’ even though the
relationships with the younger generation, mainly with Rist, were more relevant. He was
a pupil of a well known French Paris Group economist: Clement Colson
17It is interesting to note that Schumpeter (1954) made another distinction between two
forms of metallism: a theoretical metallism and a practical metallism (ibid: 403-404). The
idea was to demonstrate that metallism could still be useful for the conduct of monetary
policy whilst being out of date to define money.
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sentially defined by its store of value function which is seen as ‘the most
important function, and the one which is probably at the origin of all the
others’ (ibid: 347-348). The store of value function is seen as an ‘insur-
ance against the uncertainties of the future’ (ibid). Rist rejected all forms of
inflation and deflation in the economy. According to his own book on de-
flation, Rist (1927) defined it as a permanent ‘reduction in the instruments
of circulation’ originating from ‘the issue of forced currency bank notes or
from State paper-money.’ (ibid:1). Thus, the idea of a monetary policy that
gave due place to open-market regulation in spite of a pure discount rate
management was not welcomed. Rist’s monetary theory is quite well-known
for its fundamental distinction between money, meaning gold money, and
credit or fiduciary money, meaning bank notes or bank deposits. To Rist,
only the former deserved the label of ‘money’ whereas the latter was just a
substitute for money that helped monetary circulation. They were just an
instrument of payment but they were not money per se. As a consequence,
monetary policy should only be concerned with gold accumulation so as to
ensure the convertibility of notes into gold. These distinction had practical
consequences for monetary policymaking.
In fact, Rist favored a monetary policy based on a discount rate man-
agement in line with the Classical lessons of the monetary orthodoxy. By
emphasizing the store of value function, Rist was opposed to authors of his
time who supported non-metallic currency ideas such as Knut Wicksell, John
Law or even John Maynard Keynes. He rejected Keynes (and Cassel) un-
derstanding on the interwar monetary crisis and depression which supported
the idea of a managed money and their explanation of inflation disconnected
from the Quantity Theory (Bellet, Gloria-Palermo, and Zouache 2004). For
instance, Wicksell’s thesis according to which a mismatch between the nat-
ural rate of interest and the effective rate of interest (i.e discount rate) is
not seen by Rist as a valuable explanation18. We found a critical lecture
note on Wicksell’s theory19 that Rist gave in the thirties at the university for
doctoral studies when he taught monetary crisis. The main criticism relied
on the doubtful existence on a natural rate of interest in Wicksell theoretical
corpus.
When the discussion on open-market operations started, Rist was at that
time second deputy governor of the Bank of France (1926-1929). He was
strongly opposed to any form of a market regulation in monetary issues such
as the monetary market in Paris which tried to provide, and regulate, the
18It was the difficulty to define and verify this hypothetical natural rate of interest that
motivated Rist to reject Wicksell’s thesis.
19Bank of France archive, Reference number: 1037 2006 03-12.
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liquidity needed by the private commercial banks. As he claimed, it would
be prejudicial to use open market procedure because it would imply that
‘the bank behaves not only as an anvil but as a hammer’ (?: 442). In other
words, Rist questioned the counter-cycle policy that banks of issue could
manage with the help of open-market operations. Thus, the Bank of France
would take the risk to loose its “operational autonomy” such as defined by
Blancheton (2001). This active policy switches the domestic market off from
the international one. By so doing, it could influence the level of liquidity
available on the international monetary market so as to offset the opposite
conjuncture in its domestic credit market (via the fluctuation of the discount
rate or the amount of gold cash reserves).
Rist opinion can be explained for two reasons. Firstly, the experience
given by history is the main proof that Rist claimed to justify his thoughts.
Rist, and most of the official members of the Bank of France, had kept
in mind a negative background concerning the open-market. They were
convinced that this instrument was at the origin of both inflation and crisis
as demonstrated by Mouré (1998). They made the confusion between open-
market practices and the advances in liquidity system that prevailed in France
during interwar. As he declared in his book on deflation in 1927, open market
was just a means to expand State’s hunger for liquidity:
Inflation was created in the form of the advances successively
agreed by the Bank of France to the government.
Rist, 1927: 60
Secondly, Rist considered that the French franc devaluation following
WW I was exclusively the result of “bad money” creation emerging from
the huge advances in liquidity that Bank of France provided to the French
Treasury for reconstruction purposes.
Rist had been strongly questioned by Schumpeter for his misunderstand-
ing of the credit mechanism. Maybe it was for that reason that French
economists at that time were not well-known abroad. In the monetary
field, the French school was really conservative. So that, the increasing de-
velopment of credit tools and the de-materialized form of money was not
seriously taken into account in France. By contrast, the Swedish school,
with its chief and spokesman Knut Wicksell, was forerunning by elaborat-
ing a modern theory which tried to ‘restate a Quantity theory in a credit-
theoretical term’ (Trautwein and Boianovsky 2001: 500)20. However, some
voices emerged among the new generation of economists, namely Nogaro,
20The label Swedish School was not given to Wicksell but to his followers such as Gunnar
Myrdal, Erik Lindahl and Gustav Cassel to name but a few.
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Aftalion and Simiand. They had in common two beliefs: first, the idea
that Quantity theory was not relevant, particularly when it is applied to the
French case, and, second, they started to admit that credit can be seen as
money. The latter point was a real betrayal regarding Rist influence on the
French economic thought. However, the position defended by Pierre Quesnay
and the Governor Moreau was more in agreement with this new monetary
thought.
2.1.2 Governor Moreau and Pierre Quesnay: the outsiders views
Contrary to Rist’s views, the Governor Moreau were enthusiastic concerning
the measures taken in direction of open-market in 1928 by the Stabilization
Law from Poincaré21. Governor Moreau expected to take advantage of the
new directives to restore the small money market of Paris. Governor Moreau,
supported by the economist Pierre Quesnay, considered that the 1928 mon-
etary law was a good opportunity to restore as well the French supremacy
on the capital market and mainly against the Bank of England domination.
Moreau and Quesnay were enthusiastic concerning the possibility offered by
the article 3 of the 1928 law which opened a source for open-market opera-
tions. By this way, Bank of France could find a productive use of its huge
metallic cash reserves while developing a new monetary policymaking in line
with the one of the major central banks.
After the Poincaré stabilization law in 1928, one of the primary policy
decision that Governor Moreau took concerned the monetary market of Paris
which was no more than a market for acceptances assets. The latter was a
kind of inter-banking market in which the Bank of France with private com-
mercial banks, business banks, credit company and others banks (such as the
‘maisons privées de haute banque’) could exchange their bank debts. This
short-term market referred explicitly to Warburg’s concept of ”circulating
credit“. The restoration of this interbank market was not insane owing to the
huge foreign reserves held by the Bank of France in that time. By using it,
Bank of France could have brought liquidity without having to act on the
discount rate. The later point was a major cause of disagreement with Rist’s
view. From the private correspondence we found in the archives of the Bank
of France between the Minister of Finances, Henry Chéron, and Governor
Moreau, we can claim that Moreau got the support of the French minister
of Finance in that time22. However, this illusion quickly disappeared under
21It should be noted that in the early days, Governor Moreau was not really enthusiastic
with open-market’s new freedom. It took time for Quesnay to convince him (Moreau 1954).
22From Chéron to Moreau “You know the importance that I grant to the creation of a
big international credit market in Paris. For that reason I will not neglect anything that
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Rist’s supremacy and the irrelevancy of the 1928 monetary law as we saw
beforehand. In 1930, Governor Moreau resigned from his official function as
governor in September. In his farewell speech, he publicly mentioned the
failure to conduct open market as one of the major reasons for his deci-
sion (Moreau 1954). This episode illustrates the power of the insiders views
within the Bank of France throughout the “Conseil des Régents” which led
the monetary decisions within Bank of France23.
Beyond that, two reasons can be added to explain Moreau and Quesnay’s
failure: (1) most of the settlement of the public debt had been settled (with
the help of the Caisse d’amortissement) in 1928 and more importantly (2)
there was a lack of cooperation between private banks. On this subject, Sir
R.G Conolly, when criticizing the French behavior during the 1931 Sterling
crisis, gave a good synthesis on the French banking behavior :
“the Parisian banks would have preferred to slit their own
throats rather than cooperate on the market.“
in Mouré, 1998: 222
2.1.3 The “Rist vs Quesnay” controversy
Quesnay and Rist opposition was a prime illustration regarding the two op-
posite views on monetary policymaking which faced one with each other in
France during interwar time. Before becoming the General Manager of the
Bank for International Settlement between 1930 and 1937, Quesnay was the
Director of the Economic Studies department in the Bank of France (1926 to
1930). Thanks to Rist, Quesnay participated, as a secretary, on the French
Board of Experts that worked on the Stabilization policy in 1926. He wrote
a few articles during, the main one dealt with banking regulation (Ques-
nay,1932).
Quesnay publicly entered into conflict with Rist at the time of discussion
on the 1928 monetary law. We found in the archive of the Bank of France
two internal notes and correspondence between them. Charles Rist wrote,
first, a note on August, 28th 1928 on the possibility for Bank of France to
intervene on the ‘outside banking market” (marché hors- banque). Without
any surprise, Rist was totally opposed to any open-market instrument for
is in my power to succeed as soon as possible in the creation of it.“ (Archives Department
of the Bank of France, Reference number: 1060-2004-01-308).
23Without changing its duties, the “Board of Regents” within the Bank of France changed
its name from 1936 and became the “General Council” of the Bank.
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Bank of France toolset owing to the inflation risk. Rist demonstration relied
on two major points: first open-market is ineffective and second open market
is also useless. On the first point, Rist denounced the upsurge of inflation
that could be consecutive to any type of Treasury bonds purchases by Bank
of France. Moreover, the regulation of the monetary mass by way of open-
market purchases will be ineffective since the quantity that Bank of France
could withdraw will be limited to the quantity it sold previously on this
interbank market. Moreover, the open-market purchases will concern only a
few banks with a specific interest rate which was contradictory with Bank
of France status. On the second point, Rist demonstrated thoroughly that
open-market purchases would have reach the same results as the Bank of
France could have reached with its discount rate management.
Two days later, Quesnay wrote a note as an answer to Rist’s one. He
answered scrupulously to any paragraph that Rist wrote. Concerning the
inflation risk, Quesnay underlined Rist’s bad faith by recalling that inflation
would emerge from open-market purchases only if an over-issue of money
was already present. In case of a normal use of open-market, the purchase
of public assets will not be prejudicial to the French banking sector and the
French economy as a whole. All along the article, Quesnay’s answers partic-
ularly insisted on the necessity for Bank of France to update its monetary
policymaking. While most of the major central banks, meaning the BoE,
the Reichsbank and the Fed, favored open-market regulation of the quantity
of money, France went it alone by favoring its old discount rate policy with
its administrative rules and procedures. The position of Pierre Quesnay was
not surprising since he had always been a defender of an international co-
operation between nations owing to the peculiar inter-war context (Quesnay
1932). All of this justifies the gathering of worldwide strength in order to act
in the same way. On this subject, Quesnay declared in August 16th 1928:
If we restrict ourselves to a discount rate policy while the other
Central Banks focus on an active management of the currency,
we will bring about prejudicial fluctuations in the capital market;
and I am convinced that far from participating in the regulation
of the international credit market, we will disturb it.
Mouré 1998: 226
The Rist vs Quesnay struggle is illustrating of two opposite way of consid-
ering monetary policy. While Rist defended the traditional Classical metalist
views on money, Quesnay was representative of an emerging new generation
of French economists disconnecting with the Quantity theory explanation of
inflation and in agreement with the new type of credit money that developed
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since the beginning of the 20th century. The most interesting point is that
the Rist vs Quesnay conflict can be understood under the famous rule vs
discretion debate inherited from Simons (1936). Rist favored an automatic
central bank’s behavior driven by the exchange rate fluctuations, the gold
points and the discount rate management. In fact, the neuralgic point in
Rist’s position turned around the discretionary power that would be given
into the hands of the Bank of France to decide whether it will buy or sell the
short-term public assets:
“The Bank will spontaneously take the decision to provide
or withdraw liquidity into the market. It expect the demands
instead of wait for them. [...] The crucial point is to decide
according to which principles and when the bank will judge as
legitimate the liquidity provision to a market which did not ask
for it.”
Rist Internal Note, 1928: 2-324
By contrast, Quesnay was a defender of a new freedom of action for Bank
of France when it has to take monetary policy decisions:
“The main feature of the open-market system is to let the
Bank to be free of action.”
Quesnay Internal Note, 1928: 225
Outside, the major central banks supported Moreau and Quesnay’s views.
In fact, during the 1931 Sterling crisis episode, the Bank of England, via Sir
Leith-Ross, asked the Bank of France to set up an open-market procedure
which could allow the injection of liquidity through the purchase of bonds
or other financial assets. Unsurprisingly, the new French governor, Clément
Moret -who followed Moreau’s mandate- also refused the British proposal
once more. The immediate answer was that ‘the open-market operations
will bring illegitimate profit to the bank’ (...) and this kind of policy-making
was an error in principle since it relied upon ‘financing the purchases of
securities thanks to the note issue’ (Mouré 1998: 148). In agreement with
Rist’s views, open-market was seen in that time as a sterilization process
with due inflationary risks.
The 1944 League of Nations’ report written by Nurkse is a good synthe-
sis of the way France was judged by the other countries in this open-market
24Bank of France archive, Reference number: 1069 2008 03- 17.
25Bank of France archive, Reference number: 1069 2008 03- 17.
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failure episode. In his report Nurkse severely criticized the French policy
during the inter-war period . More than a criticism it was a condemnation,
he accused France of being widely responsible for the collapse of the gold
standard. If France "played an important role in the breakdown of the sys-
tem"(ibid: 39) it was due to its 1928 monetary Law. In fact, this law "decided
to take nothing but gold in settlement for the enormous surplus occurring from
the repatriation of capital and from the current balance of payment" (ibid).
Consequently, and we already know the end of the story, a large part of
the British and American gold went in direction of France which forced the
other countries to accept a gold drain in their reserves (and then brought
about a depression effect on the other countries, particularly England which
later abandoned its gold pound parity). In this end of story, France had
its full part of responsibility, as claimed by Friedman in 2004. As a conse-
quence, when Bank of France was granted with the open-market instrument,
the decision was welcomed abroad. For instance, the Royal Bank of Canada
published an article26 in September 1938 so as to congratulate the new mone-
tary directives set-up in France. While mentioning that the French monetary
policy had always been thought to serve the needs of the commerce, mainly
the small shops, the Bank of Canada saw in the 1938 reform the new possi-
bility for the major central banks to cooperate. In this subject, the article
clearly denounced the “exceptional rigidity of the French credit market” that
occurred during the 1931 British Sterling crisis. The main criticism relied on
the enormous gold sterile reserves held by the Bank of France which refused
to use it to the benefit of the international credit market. The Canadian
reaction was in agreement with the thesis defended by Pierre Quesnay who
supported open-market policy in 1928 due to the necessity to cooperate with
the major central banks which already got open-market instrument in their
toolset.
2.2 The French opinion on open-market
From 1938, the reaction in newspapers was numerous not only in France but
in foreign newspaper as well. Most of the newspaper articles gave the same
negative opinion regarding the new open-market instrument: it will be a ma-
jor source of inflation. The best way to express such public opinion is taken
from the French newspaper ‘Les Nouvelles Economiques et Financières’27
dated back from July 8th 1938 with the following headlines: Towards Dicta-
torship and War. On the road to "Open-market": open market ?... open for
26Bank of France archive, Reference number: 1069 2008 07 -17.
27Bank of France archive, Reference Number
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whom ? To inflation ?28.
Among the many articles written in this corner-stone period, several ideas
and opinion emerged in the press:
• The definition of the open-market purchases:
Many of the articles took care to give a more or less relevant defini-
tion of ‘open-market purchases’ since this type of central banks inter-
vention was not widespread in France. We have to keep in mind that
the French monetary policy system was an administrative management
of the money issue with a long strained relationship history between
the Bank of France and the French Treasury (Blancheton 2001). Thus,
when the idea of a free intervention for Bank of France appeared, it was
a real revolution in the French monetary system. Until now, most of
the Bank of France decisions were made under the pressure -or the full
authority- of the French Treasury for the State financing purpose. The
first task was to translate “open-market” for French people who were
not ready -even nowadays- to use English words in their day-to-day
vocabulary. Among most of the newspapers, the ‘open-market policy’
expression was translated by ‘free market operations policy’ expression.
This way of translating the expression “open-market” contains an ul-
terior motive by putting the stress on the word ‘free’ meaning that
the Bank of France would be free to decide when it has to sell or buy
short-term public assets; but also meaning that Bank of France will
loose its control to the benefit of the emerging free interbank money
market. Some of the articles published in this period mentioned that
the open-market purchases will be limited to a maximum amount so as
to prevent the French Treasury to use it as a source of funding.
We have to note that in most of the headlines chosen by the newspa-
pers in 1938, the word inflation has always been associated with open-
market which encouraged French public opinion to see open-market
purchases as the new monetary devil as opposed to the previous one
(i.e the system of State’s advances in liquidity by the Bank of France).
• Open market as a new type of inflation instrument to the benefit of the
State:
In that time of WW I reconstruction, the French Treasury tried to
restore a new balance of the State account, particularly after the Sta-
bilization law -known under the name of Poincaré Law- in 1928. As
a consequence, the French public opinion saw open-market instrument
28The translation is mine. The original title was: "Sur la route de l’ "open-market":
Open market ?... Marché ouvert. Ouvert à quoi ? A l’inflation ?".
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as a source of funding for the State. This is the point that French
newspaper supported in most of the case.
The French newspaper -called L’Intransigeant- presented the 1938 mon-
etary decree-law as a complementary regulation of the ones which re-
stored the financial reconstruction of the country decided by the left
wing coalition power in place from 1936. By mentioning that the French
Treasury needed 40 billions of French francs in 1938 to restore the finan-
cial situation of the country, the open-market new freedom was seen
as a State financing new device. Without any surprise, the extreme
left wing newspaper -called l’Humanité- did the same. the newspaper
gave an oriented definition of the open-market purchases. The article
dealt only with the inflation risk linked with open-market instrument
without mentioning that those assets purchases will be quantitatively
limited. Open-market purchases were no more than a new way to mon-
etize the huge public debt as the French government did since the end
of WW I and during this reconstruction period. By monetizing the
public debt, the newspaper makes the reference with the advances in
liquidity system that existed till 1928 and which had been restored by
a new Convention in 1936 (June 18th). After 1936, not only were the
temporary advances re-established, but they were also assured to be
interest-free for the credit service. In that sense, open- market assets
were seen as a modern type of advances in liquidity for the account of
the French Treasury with a higher risk. Since the advances in liquidity
had been the major source of inflation after WW I, the open-market
assets were seen as the same monetary devil. Each time inflation in-
creased, it was the fixed income people that will suffer the most. The
newspaper l’Humanité saw inflation as an indirect type of income tax
in a context in which the fiscal weight was already too heavy. The
French newspaper (Aux écoutes de la Finance from July, 1st 1938 be-
longs to the same faction as the l’Humanité newspaper by writing in
its headlines “the return of the floating debt”.
However, the most interesting point of view is to be found in the ‘Ori-
entation économique, industrielle et financière newspaper dated back
from July, 2th 1938. The open-market instrument was compared to the
dark French episode of the ‘assignats’ of the 18th century29. From this
29The ‘assignats’ were paper money issued by the National Constitutional Assembly
in France during the French Revolution in 18th century. Those were issued after the
confiscation of church properties in 1790 following the government’s bankruptcy. The
government thought that the financial problems could be solved by printing certificates
representing the value of church properties. Assignats were used to successfully absorb a
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episode, the article put the stress on the inflation risk driven by the
State’s hanger for liquidity in these times of huge public debt. More-
over, the comparison draw the attention on the loose of control risk for
Bank of France since there was no control over the amount of assignats
to be printed in that time. The assignats’ episode brought about sharp
inflation and a widespread mistrust towards dematerialized money and
assets or towards whatever new type of money and assets disconnecting
from gold.
As a first step conclusion, open-market instrument was not welcomed
by the French opinion, mainly due to the way the French newspaper define
it. We have to keep in mind that the interwar period is peculiar. History
mattered for French people. They did not forget the last fifteen years of
currency disconnecting from gold, the 1928 Stabilization law that officially
recognized the devaluation of the French francs and the huge public debt
that strangled the whole country after WW I particularly due to an over-use
of temporary advances instrument by the French Treasury. The open-market
instrument was regarded as a possible threat for the Bank of France ability
to control not only the monetary mass circulation, meaning inflation, but
also to surround the State’s hanger for liquidity.
significant portion of the national debt as they were accepted as legitimate payment by
domestic and international creditors. However, their excessive reissuing and the confusion
with general currency in circulation caused hyper-inflation. Originally meant as bonds,
Assignats evolved into a currency used as legal tender. As there was no control over
the amount to be printed, the value of the Assignats exceeded that of the confiscated
properties. This caused massive hyper-inflation. At the beginning of 1792, the Assignats
had lost most of their nominal value. In 1796, the Directoire issued ‘Mandats’, a currency
in the form of land warrants to replace the Assignats, although these too quickly failed.
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3 The unfair competition thesis: Bank of France’s
discounting operations vs open-market oper-
ations
‘The (bank) metamorphosis from their involvement in com-
mercial banking, as a competitive, profit-maximizing bank among
many, to a non-competitive non-profit-maximizing role that marked
the true emergence and development of proper Central Bank-
ing.”30
Goodhart 1988: 9
The open-market operations were seen as a substitute for the advance on
liquidities to the French government. As the quotation written by Goodhart
teaches us, profitability mattered more for Bank of France than in the other
central banks (Goodhart 1988). As a consequence, a second hypothesis can
be opened: Bank of France everlastingly refused open-market owing to the
fact those operations were prejudicial for the profit maximizing purpose of
the Bank. This unfair competition thesis could explain why the French con-
servatism prevailed for a (too) long time. In that sense, the conservatism was
in reality a French hanger for profit at the expense of the central banking
duties.
3.1 Did the open-market assets being a source of fund-
ing for the Treasury?
Among the major reason of disapproval, the inflationary risk originated from
excessive Treasury bonds issue -and bought by the Bank of France- prevailed.
France got increasing needs in liquidity due to the floating debt burden in-
herited from WW I (see figure 3 in Appendix part)31. As showed by the
figure (3) in the appendix part, the French debt was mostly an internal debt
originated from huge amount of public assets’ issue (Dulles 1929). This type
of floating debt was seen as the most dangerous because of the fact it ma-
tured early but also because of its size. It was seen as inflationary because
those assets were issued at a lower and fixed interest rate that would pre-
vail.The money issue -mainly under the form of advances and note issue-
30The word in brackets is mine
31The floating debt refers to the part of the public debt which is not consolidated by
medium and long term assets. In other words, it is the total amount of public loans in the
form of Treasury bonds, advances from Bank of France or specific war bonds called “Bons
de la Défense Nationale”.
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increased which created in its turn an inflationary process (see figure (1) in
the Appendix part) in a Wicksellian kind of way, i.e cumulative fashion way
(Wicksell 1898).
Bank of France agreed to the French Treasury different types of advances
in liquidity according the signature of several Conventions. From 1938 to
1951 no more than four different Conventions had been granted by law so as to
authorized the Bank of France to provide huge amount of provisory advances
to the French Treasury and for free. We have to note that in these hard times
of interwar periods, the liquidity was missing and particularly after WW II.
For that reason, the amount of advances in liquidity to the French Treasury
strongly raised after WW II. The system of advances featured the French
monetary machinery. For a very short time (between 1928 to 1936), Bank of
France ended its duty as the official financial manager of the State. As we
already saw, the advances in liquidity were mainly criticized since they were
the main roots for inflation as Rist always claimed. As a consequence, Bank
of France’s member of the General Council took particular care on this item.
The General Council published a report on the November, 23th 1939 session
on that issue32. The Permanent Comity of the Bank made this declaration
within the session:
The money market is not able to satisfy the huge demand
on liquidity by the State. We have the duty to prevent the risk
of a monetary tightening; and since the required amount served
to reimburse us, it is thus that we make an effort. It is prefer-
able that this effort take place by way of the“negotiable assets in
France”item rather than the “advances in liquidity” item.
General Council Session, November, 23th 1939: 2
The report on this session clearly mentioned that the stability of the
“advances in liquidity” item is a crucial element so as to assure public opinion
confidence. It is right that French opinion took peculiar care on this item
due to the previous period habits in which the Treasury made an intensive
use of this source of funding in the previous years (mainly 1918-1928). As a
consequence, inflation dramatically raised up (see figure (1) in the Appendix
part) (Maddisson 1981). We have to note that the 1939 year was featured
by an increasing need in liquidity which explained why the portfolio asset of
the Bank of France increased dramatically from 670 millions of French francs
in september 1938, 14th to 4.654 millions of French francs in november, 23th
1939. As a consequence, the evolution of the “advances in liquidity” item in
32Bank of France archive, Reference Number: 1069 2008 03 -16.
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the Bank of France balance sheet should be analyzed at the same time as
the “negotiable assets bought in France” item. The figure (??) gathers the
evolution of open-market purchases, from 1938 to 1951, with the evolution
of the different types of advances Bank of France provided to the State.
According to the insiders concerns, we could have expected that the ‘ne-
gotiable assets bought in France” item increased while the “advances in liq-
uidity” item decreased after 1938. As we can see in figure (??), both items
increased during this period so as to serve the needs of the State. We have to
remember that the system of advances in liquidity, such as it existed before
1928, had been fully restored by the 1938 law. After 1936, not only were the
temporary advances service were re-established but it was also assured to be
interest-free for the credit service.
As Rist and the insiders’ clan worried, open market became an important
monetary policy tool but only after WW II. However, the use of the advances
in liquidity agreed by the Bank of France did not ended as a counterpart.
On the contrary, both source of fundings increased after WW II, mainly
due to the reconstruction needs. This feature is typical of the French bad
habits which never stopped using advances in liquidity provided by Bank of
France. This facility was seen as the price to pay for the privilege of issue
that the Bank of France owed until 1945 and which had been renewed after
the Nationalization of the Bank at that date.
3.2 Open-market purchases vs discounting operations:
an unfair competition?
The open-market purchases of the Bank of France were ranked in its balance
sheet in the ‘negotiable assets bought in France’ item. The later gathered
mostly, Treasury bonds, National Defense bonds, Commercial papers from
the National Railway Company (SNCF) and banking acceptances. When
Rist considered the possibility or not to use open-market among the official
monetary policy toolset of the Bank of France, he clearly pointed out the
risk of a loss in profitability that those purchases will bring about. In fact,
not only open-market assets would be preferred to discountable commercial
papers when the banks would be in search for liquidity funds; but also the
open-market activity will be made at different level of interest rates while the
discounting activities are paid at a fixed price decided by the General Coun-
cil of the Bank. The later structural transformation in policymaking would
imply a loss of monetary control to the benefits of the money market. The
last point was clearly in opposition with the old French way of policymaking
according to which Bank of France should serve the needs of commerce to
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every firms and banks and particularly with a unique and quite fixed dis-
count rate. By contrast, the Bank of England, for instance, fixed different
types of discount rates which had always been put into question by French
policymakers and economists. Several reports from the General Council of
the Bank criticized en passant the British policy of adjudication at different
level of interest rates.
A confidential internal note from the Economic Department Studies of
the Bank of France in August, 19th 1939, opened the profitability debate as
follows:
It is noteworthy that every type of intervention on this mar-
ket is, by nature, a possible risk to the Bank which would be,
according to its size, incompatible with the normal exercise of its
privilege. Even if this problem could be satisfyingly resolved by
the Bank, it thus, results, that in the most favorable hypothesis,
the average rate of return of its productive operations would be
sensitively lowered ; for such a reason a revision of the contract
between the bank of issue and the State should be considered.
Internal Confidential Note, Economic Studies Depart., 19th
1939: 633
By “productive operations” we should understand the traditional discount-
ing operations of the Bank. Not only open-market was seen as an indirect
form of advances in liquidity for the State, but also it would have been an
unfair competition for the profit maximizing function of the Bank and its
shareholders. Thus, it was not a surprise why open market had been so
longly put into question.
The Bank of France’s profitability debate emerged between the Rist vs
Quesnay struggle as well. At the heart of the debate, the possibility for Bank
of France to have different levels of interest rates prevailed. In his internal
note34 we already quoted, Rist declared as follows:
Every money that the Bank will put directly into the (money)
market will set up a competition to itself. [...] The intervention on
the money market interferes with the traditional monetary policy
instruments which are presently at the disposal of the Bank, with
regrettable effects either for the Bank itself or for the market in
general.
33Bank of France archive, Reference Number: 1397 1994 03 -66.
34Bank of France archive, Reference number: 1069 2008 03- 17.
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Rist Internal Note, 1928: 4-5
By answer, Quesnay rejected such argument by legitimating that the
lower profitability return of the open-market operations would be justified
only in the extent of a bad management of the asset portfolio of the Bank’s
balance sheet:
It is untrue to say that these operations (i.e open-market
ones) will represent a competition to itself (meaning the Bank of
France). If the Bank gets an asset portfolio with acceptances that
will earn less than its traditional discounted commercial papers
portfolio, it would be, thus, right to say that it gets a portfo-
lio similar to that of the other banks of issue and with a totally
different value from the one it traditionally hold. 35
Quesnay Internal Note, 1928: 4
As we can understand, Rist and Quesnay did not speak at the same
level. While Rist referred to the profitability issue of the bank, meaning
Bank of France as a private commercial banks, Quesnay favored the central
bank’s duties and the necessity to have modern instrument so as to assure
the liquidity of the banking system.
35The parenthesis are mine.
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Conclusion
The everlasting rejection of the open-market purchases was mainly driven by
dogmatic reason entrusted in the person of Charles Rist and his followers.
The Rist vs Quesnay debate was enlightening in this respect since it teaches
us to what extent two types of policymaking get opposed in that interwar
time.
As already mentioned by several leading economists (Keynes, Cassel,
Schumpeter to name a few) France was static and conservative when it was
question of monetary policymaking. Even after the 1938 law that officially
set up open-market into the hands of Bank of France, it needed time for
French policymakers to use it. However, this French monetary heterodoxy
was also strategic. France did not want to loose power to the benefit of the
monetary market, meaning to the benefits of the British leadership. The
best way to understand the French position is to analyze it while keeping
one eye on the French-British competition in the money market. Both were
candidate for being at the head of the ‘monetary orchestra’. Giving too much
power to market would have let the doors open for the Bank of England.
Moreover, Bank of France did not want to loose its old fashionedmonetary
policy featured by discount rate management with a unique rate of interest.
Authorizing open-market would have implied to admit that monetary policy
called for changes and among them agreeing to have several types of fluctu-
ating interest rates. Behind that static position, it is mainly the willingness
of the Bank of France to keep its discretionary power that prevailed. In fact,
open-market operations in its pure version would have implied to reverse the
power from the Bank of France to the hands of the money market. It is
for that reason that Bank of France set up in practice only a State regu-
lated version of open-market instruments with strong legal constraints that
surrounded the money market practices, i.e maximum roof for open-market
purchases and fixed rates. By so doing, Bank of France maintained for a
couple of years its operational autonomy against the money market control.
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Appendix
Date of General Council session Open-market Maximum Amount
July, 7th, 1938 Art.8:
• no more than 8% of the gold cash reserves;
and
• no more than 50% of the total asset of both
discounted commercial papers and short term
(30 days) advances in liquidity
July, 6th, 1939 The second item in the preceding article 8 is canceled
February, 29th, 1940 Open-market purchases amounted to 10 billions of
French francs
October, 29th, 1940 Open-market purchases amounted to 15 billions of
French francs
January, 11th, 1945 Open-market purchases amounted to 40 billions of
French francs
September, 12th, 1946 Open-market purchases amounted to 75 billions of
French francs
January, 2nd, 1948 Open-market purchases amounted to 125 billions of
French francs
March, 24th, 1949 Open-market purchases amounted to 150 billions of
French francs
May, 19th, 1949 Open-market purchases amounted to 200 billions of
French francs
May, 4th and 10th, 1951 The maximum amount of 200 billion can be ex-
ceeded.
May, 21st, 1951 Open-market purchases amounted to 250 billions of
French francs
June, 28th, 1951 The maximum amount of 250 billions can be ex-
ceeded.
August, 2nd, 1951 The maximum amount of 250 billions can be ex-
ceeded. The decision to increase the maximum
amount is delayed to a further session.
October, 18th, 1951 It is seen as preferable to wait before deciding to
an upper level of maximum amount of open-market
purchases.
May, 19th, 1949 Open-market purchases amounted to 200 billions of
French francs
December, 20th, 1951 The maximum amount of 250 billions can be ex-
ceeded.
March, 27th, 1952 The maximum amount of 250 billions can be ex-
ceeded once more.
April, 3rd, 1952 Open-market purchases amounted to 300 billions of
French francs
June, 28th, 1956 The maximum amount of 300 billions can be ex-
ceeded.
November, 28th, 1968 The maximum amount of open-market purchases is
canceled.
Table 1: Open-Market Maximum Amount granted by the General
Council of the Bank of France
Source: Bank of France archive, Reference Number: 1069 2008 03- 17.
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Figure 1: French Price Index (1914-1950)
Source: A. Maddisson, 1981, Annexe E-7, p.300.
31
Figure 2: French Debt Structure (1918-1927)
Source: Dulles (1929: 244)
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Figure 3: French Internal Debt Structure (1918-1927)
Source: Dulles (1929: 244)
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